Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P, Jr
Volume 21 | Number 23 Article 2
12-3-2010
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr (2010) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 21 : No. 23 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol21/iss23/2
later years without further action by the Congress.
ENDNOTES
 1 Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a), (b), 115 Stat. 38 (2001). See 
Harl and McEowen, “Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 
2001, H.R. 1836: Summary of Selected Provisions,” 12 Agric. 
L. Dig. 81 (2001); Harl and McEowen, “Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836: Summary of 
Selected Provisions –Part II,” 12 Agric. L. Dig. 97 (2001). See 
also Harl, “Income Tax Basis for Decedents Dying in 2010,” 21 
Agric. L. Dig. 81 (2010).
 2 See Harl, “Tempted to Make Big Gifts in 2010?” 21 Agric. 
L. Dig. 185 (2010).
 3 See Harl, “Income Tax Basis for Decedents Dying in 2010,” 
21 Agric. L. Dig. 81 (2010).
 4 I.R.C. § 2031(a). See also Malm v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 
2d 1040 (D. N.C. 2005) (basis determined by date of death, not 
date of estate’s sale of assets).
 5 I.R.C. § 1022(a)(1).
 6 I.R.C. § 1022(a)(2).
 7 I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(B).
 8 I.R.C. § 1022(c).
 9 I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(C).
 10 I.R.C. § 1022(b)(3).
 11  2010 University of Illinois Federal Tax Workbook p. 366 
(2010).
 12 EGTRRA, § 901(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 
(2001) (emphasis added).
 
of the decedent’s death.”6 There are, of course, adjustments 
authorized to the decedent’s adjusted basis (the aggregate basis 
increase of $1,300,000,7 the increase for “qualified spousal 
property” of  up to $3,000,000,8 the adjustment for built-in 
losses and loss carryovers9 and the adjustment for decedent 
non-residents of the United States of $60,000.10
  EGTRRA in Section 901 provides for a “sunsetting” of all 
provisions in the 2001 Act (including I.R.C. § 1022) –
“All provisions of and amendments made by this Act shall 
not apply – (2) . . . .to estates of decedents dying, gifts 
made, or generation skipping transfers, after December 
31, 2010.”
Some have argued that somehow, for deaths in 2010, the heirs 
will still retain a fair market value basis if the inherited assets are 
sold after 2010.11 That is not what the statute states. To repeat, the 
statute merely states that “. . . this Act shall not apply . . . to estates 
of decedents dying. . . after December 31, 2010.”12 The sunset 
provision says nothing about the sale of assets in 2011 or later. 
Neither the statute nor the sunset provision says anything about 
the basis of decedents dying in 2010 being entitled to a step-up 
(or down) in basis in 2011. The statute merely states that the 
various Act provisions will not apply to deaths after December 
31, 2010. There is a lack of credible authority for arguing that, 
for a death in 2010, the property is entitled to a new basis if the 
assets are held until 2011 or later. 
Rules for determining basis for deaths after 2010
 Assuming that Congress restores the concept of a new basis 
at death (or allows the current law to continue), property held 
by decedents dying after 2010 will be entitled to a new basis at 
death (stepped up or down) under the rules of I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
Congressional action to restore carryover basis after 2010 
would require enactment or reenactment of carryover basis rules 
because the rules in EGTRRA will not be effective in 2011 and 
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
ANImALS
 HORSES.  The plaintiff was a minor injured when bitten by a 
horse owned by the defendants. The defendants raised the defense 
that they were not liable for the injury because there was no 
evidence that the horse had a propensity to bite people or that the 
defendants knew of any such propensity. The defendants sought 
summary judgement and the trial court granted their motion. The 
court found that there was no evidence that the horse had any history 
of biting people and the plaintiff showed only that horses had a 
general tendency to bite if they thought food was offered by hand. 
The plaintiff also sought liability under the attractive nuisance 
doctrine. The court also rejected this claim of liability because 
Connecticut has not adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine but 
relies solely on a standard negligence that requires a higher degree 
of care with children.  Vendrella v. Astriab Family Limited 
Partnership, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2380 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2010).
 STRICT LIABILITY. The plaintiff was injured when the 
plaintiff’s car struck the defendant’s cow on a public highway. The 
plaintiff sued alleging negligence and strict liability under S.C. 
Code § 47-7-130. The defendant was granted summary judgment 
on the claim of strict liability.  The defendant argued, and the trial 
plaintiff argued that, as a merchant under the UCC, the defendant 
had admitted the existence and terms of the contract after the 
plaintiff had sent the defendant a letter outlining the oral contracts’ 
terms. In a decision designated as not for publication, the appellate 
court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for 
the plaintiff. The court acknowledged that the issue of whether a 
farmer can be a merchant under the UCC had not been decided 
in an appellate court in Minnesota but relied on similar cases in 
other states. The court found that the defendant was a merchant 
under the UCC because (1) the defendant had been farming since 
1973, (2) the defendant had taken agricultural and business classes 
in college, (3) the defendant made all marketing decisions, (4) 
the defendant had sold grain to a variety of buyers and (5) the 
defendant had experience with cash sales and futures contracts. 
Glacial Plains Cooperative v. Lindgren, 2010 minn. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 880 (minn. Ct. App. 2010).
FEDERAL FARm
PROGRAmS
 EmERGENCY FOREST RESTORATION PROGRAm. 
The FSA has issued interim regulations amending the regulations 
to implement the new Emergency Forest Restoration Program 
(EFRP) as required by the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act 
of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill). The EFRP will provide financial 
assistance to owners of non-industrial private forest land to restore 
land that was damaged by a natural disaster on or after January 
1, 2010. This interim rule also reorganizes existing Emergency 
Conservation Program (ECP) regulations to incorporate EFRP and 
makes minor technical amendments to the existing regulations 
for ECP including general regulations that will now apply to both 
ECP and EFRP. 75 Fed. Reg. 70083 (Nov. 17, 2010).
 CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed 
regulations to amend the common crop insurance regulations, 
extra long staple cotton crop insurance provisions, to remove 
all references to the daily spot cotton quotation and replace the 
reference with the national average loan rate published by the 
FSA, to incorporate a current special provisions statement into 
the crop provisions, and to make the extra long staple cotton 
crop insurance provisions consistent with the upland cotton crop 
insurance provisions. The changes will apply for the 2012 and 
succeeding crop years. 75 Fed. Reg. 70850 (Nov. 19, 2010).
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 mARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent had established a 
trust prior to marriage to the surviving spouse. The couple had 
entered into a marital agreement which had some terms that 
were inconsistent with the trust as to distribution of property 
at the decedent’s death among the surviving spouse and other 
court held, that S.C. Code § 47-7-130 did not apply to personal 
injuries.  The statute provides that an owner of a domestic animal 
is liable for all damages resulting from a trespassing animal. The 
appellate court held that the statute allowed all types of damages, 
to real and personal property and for injuries to persons.  However, 
the court held that the statute applied only for trespassing animals; 
therefore, summary judgment for the defendant on the claim of 
strict liability was proper.  Williams v. Smalls, 2010 S.C. App. 
LEXIS 222 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).
 BANkRUPTCY
GENERAL
 ATTORNEY’S FEES. The debtor was a lawyer and 
had successfully challenged an IRS claim in the taxpayer’s 
bankruptcy case. The debtor acted pro se in the bankruptcy case 
and the challenge to the IRS claim and sought attorney’s fees. 
The Bankruptcy Court awarded the fees but the appellate court 
reversed, holding that attorney’s fees could not be awarded where 
the debtor had not incurred any out-of-pocket expenses from 
engaging the services of an attorney. United States v. Hudson, 
2010-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,719 (2d Cir. 2010).
FEDERAL TAX
 DISCHARGE. The debtor owed taxes from 1999, 2000 and 
2001 resulting from withdrawals from an IRA with insufficient 
withholding of taxes. In addition to insufficient withholding of 
taxes from the distributions, the taxpayer withdrew all of the IRA 
funds, stopped using checking accounts, and made extravagant 
purchases of real estate and personal property. The court held 
that the taxes were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C) 
for  willful attempting to evade payment of the taxes. The court 
found that the debtor had made affirmative acts to avoid payment 
of the taxes by dealing in cash, stopping direct deposit of salary 
payments and opening a new bank account used to convert 
checks to cash.  The court also found two indicia of willfulness: 
the debtor’s intentional changing of withholding amounts to less 
than the amount sufficient to pay taxes and the debtor’s changing 
to cash dealing after the IRS levied against the debtor’s checking 
account. In re Barkley v. United States, 2010-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,725 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010).
CONTRACTS
 FARmER AS mERCHANT. The defendant farmer  had 
entered into a series of oral contracts with the plaintiff cooperative 
for the sale of grain.  The defendant failed to perform on two of 
the contracts and the plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract. 
The defendant raised a statute of frauds defense and the plaintiff 
sought summary judgment under the claim that the defendant 
was a merchant under the Minnesota UCC § 336.2-201(2). The 
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heirs. The surviving spouse and other heirs obtained legal 
counsel and negotiated a resolution of the inconsistencies. The 
surviving spouse received estate property under the settlement 
agreement and the estate sought a ruling that amounts distributed 
to the spouse under the agreement were eligible for the marital 
deduction. The IRS ruled that the settlement was reached 
in good faith settlement of the spouse’s legally enforceable 
claims; therefore, the property received under the settlement 
was eligible for the marital deduction.  Ltr. Rul. 201046004, 
Aug. 17, 2010.
 FEDERAL INCOmE 
TAXATION
 ACCOUNTING mETHOD. The taxpayer had timely filed 
its federal income tax return for the taxable year, along with 
the original Form 3115 filed under Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2002-
1 C.B. 327, to change its method of accounting for deducting 
internal employee compensation in the year the compensation is 
incurred, commencing with the taxable year ended. However, the 
taxpayer failed to file a duplicate of the Form 3115 with the IRS 
until one day after the deadline contained in section 6.02(3)(a) 
of Rev. Proc. 2008-52 due to an oversight by the taxpayer’s 
tax preparation service beyond the taxpayer’s control. The IRS 
allowed the taxpayer an extension of time to file Form 3115. 
Ltr. Rul. 201046002, Aug. 18, 2010.
 BONDS. The IRS has issued guidance on the determination 
of when state and local bonds, as defined in I.R.C. § 103(c) 
are considered “issued” for purposes of deadlines on issuing 
bonds. The notice provides guidance on the relevant distinction 
between the “issue date” of a “bond” versus the “issue date” 
of an “issue” for purposes of this determination. One instance, 
among others, in which the notice applies is in determining when 
Build America Bonds, structured as “draw-down” bonds or loans 
in which draws are funded at different times, are considered 
issued for purposes of statutory deadlines on issuing these bonds 
under I.R.C. § 54AA. The notice does not apply for purposes of 
applying the qualified small issuer and de minimis exceptions 
to the tax-exempt carrying cost disallowance provision under 
I.R.C. § 265(b)(3) and I.R.C. § 265(b)(7) to draw-down loans. 
Notice 2010-81, I.R.B. 2010-50.
 BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was self-employed 
as a loan officer and worked with a loan processor. The 
taxpayer testified that the loan processor was to be paid 90 
percent of the loan commissions obtained by both parties. The 
taxpayer’s bank statements and checks demonstrated a pattern 
of deposits of the loan commission checks and payments to the 
loan processor of approximately 90 percent of the deposited 
commissions. However, there were several deposits which did 
not match the pattern. The court believed the taxpayer that the 
later deposits were only deposits of the taxpayer’s share of the 
loan commissions and that the remainder was paid in cash to the 
loan processor. The court allowed business wage deductions for 
the amounts paid by checks to the loan processor but adjusted 
the wage deductions allowed for the cash payments to reflect 
the same percentage as the check payments. The taxpayer’s 
deductions for other business expenses were disallowed for 
failure to provide any written substantiation of the expenses. 
Jenkins v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2010-251.
 COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEmENTS. The taxpayer 
suffered physical injuries and sickness while incarcerated in a 
state prison. The taxpayer was released after it was determined 
that the taxpayer was wrongfully convicted. The state 
legislature  enacted legislation which provided compensation 
for persons wrongfully convicted and the taxpayer received 
payments under this law. In a Chief Counsel Advice letter, the 
IRS ruled that payments received under the state compensation 
law were excludible from taxable income as compensation for 
physical injuries. CCA 201045023, Nov. 4, 2010.
 DISABILITY PAYmENTS. The taxpayer’s employer 
carried a disability insurance policy which provided monthly 
payments if the taxpayer was unable to work because of a 
physical disability. The taxpayer was injured while working 
and filed a claim for the disability, which was rejected. The 
taxpayer eventually obtained a settlement after filing a lawsuit 
against the insurance company. The insurance company issued 
a Form 1099 listing the settlement payment as miscellaneous 
income but sent the form to the wrong address. The taxpayer 
had a tax return preparer prepare the income tax return and 
the issue of the taxable nature of the settlement payment was 
investigated  with calls to the employer and the IRS, both of 
which indicated that the settlement was not taxable. The IRS 
assessed a deficiency for the tax on the settlement amount. 
The court examined the original disability insurance policy 
to determine the nature of the payments and found that the 
payments were intended to substitute for the loss of income 
from a disability and were not intended as compensation for 
the injury itself. The court found that the settlement payment 
was intended to pay the taxpayer for the lost payments under 
the insurance policy and were not intended as compensation 
for the injury itself; therefore, the payments were taxable under 
I.R.C. § 105(c). The court refused to assess the accuracy-related 
penalty under I.R.C. § 6662 because the taxpayers made a 
reasonable attempt to determine the tax nature of the settlement 
and did not receive the Form 1099. Gentile v. Comm’r, T.C. 
memo. 2010-254.
 DISASTER LOSSES.  On November 2, 2010, the President 
determined that certain areas in South Dakota are eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of 
severe storms and flooding, which began on July 20, 2010. 
FEmA-1947-DR.  On November 5, 2010, the President 
determined that certain areas in the Virgin Islands are eligible 
for assistance from the government under the Act as a result of 
severe storms and flooding, which began on October 1, 2010. 
FEmA-1948-DR.   Accordingly, taxpayers in the areas may 
deduct the losses on their 2009 federal income tax returns. See 
Agricultural Law Digest 181
I.R.C. § 165(i).
 DOmESTIC PRODUCTION DEDUCTION. The 
taxpayer was a non-exempt farmer’s marketing and purchasing 
agricultural cooperative. The cooperative made payments 
to members and participating patrons for grain produced 
by the members and patrons which were qualified per-unit 
retain allocations because they were (1) distributed with 
respect to the crops that the cooperative stored, processed and 
marketed for its patrons; (2) determined without reference 
to the cooperative’s net earnings; and (3) paid pursuant to 
a contract with the patrons establishing the necessary pre-
existing agreement and obligation, and within the payment 
period of I.R.C. § 1382(d). The IRS ruled that the cooperative 
was allowed to add back these amounts paid to members as 
net proceeds in calculating its qualified production activities 
income under I.R.C. § 199(d)(3)(C). Ltr. Rul. 201046001, 
Aug. 6, 2010
 INCOmE. The taxpayer, a public utility, started a pilot 
program to determine the effectiveness of smart grid 
photovoltaic systems for residential customers. The customers 
received different types of systems installed in their homes 
without cost. The systems became the permanent property 
of the customers and had the potential to add value to the 
customers’ homes. The IRS ruled that the value of the systems 
was not income to the customers but constituted energy 
conservation subsidies excluded from income under I.R.C. § 
136. Ltr. Rul. 201046013, Aug. 10, 2010.
 IRA. The IRS has issued guidance to drafters and users of 
pre-approved IRAs and drafters and users of prototype IRAs, 
including rules for when documents must be submitted to the 
Internal Revenue Service and new user fees for individual 
retirement annuities. The revenue procedure also provides 
guidance to users of the IRS’s model IRAs and describes the 
availability of new model individual retirement annuities. Rev. 
Proc. 2010-48, I.R.B. 2010-50.
 INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF. The taxpayer and spouse 
failed to file returns and pay taxes for several years due to the 
taxpayer’s spouse’s financial difficulties. The spouse suffered 
from depression and alcoholism and was eventually admitted 
for rehabilitation treatment. The taxpayer discovered the non-
filings and unpaid taxes during the spouse’s treatment and made 
some attempts to file the returns. The couple separated but did 
not divorce. The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled 
to equitable innocent spouse relief, under I.R.C. § 6015(f) and 
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, because the taxpayer was 
still married, the taxpayer did not demonstrate any economic 
hardship from paying the taxes, the taxpayer had not fully 
complied with the tax laws since the tax years involved, the 
taxpayer would receive a significant benefit from not paying the 
taxes and the taxpayer had reason to know that the taxes were 
not being paid.  Pugsley v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2010-255.
 During the taxpayer’s marriage, the couple’s income came 
solely from the spouse’s sole proprietorship business. The spouse 
controlled the financial information from the business and there 
was evidence of mental and physical abuse of the taxpayer by the 
spouse. The couple divorced and the IRS assessed unpaid taxes 
from which the taxpayer sought innocent spouse relief. The court 
granted equitable innocent spouse relief under Rev. Proc. 2003-
61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, because (1) the taxpayer was divorced, (2) 
the taxpayer would suffer economic hardship from paying the 
taxes; (3) the taxpayer had since complied with all tax laws; (4) 
the taxpayer would not receive a significant benefit from not 
paying the taxes; and (5) the taxpayer was abused by  the former 
spouse during the tax years involved. Drayer v. Comm’r, T.C. 
memo. 2010-257.
 LEGAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was an S corporation 
owned by another corporation. An employee of the taxpayer was 
a shareholder of the other corporation. The employee provided 
investment services for a third corporation which committed 
embezzlement of its clients’ funds. Although the taxpayer 
ceased business with the third corporation upon learning about 
the embezzlement, the employee failed to timely report the 
embezzlement to the proper authorities and the employee pled 
guilty of misprison, resulting in a fine, order for restitution, and 
a prison sentence. The taxpayer paid the fine and restitution 
assessment and legal fees for the employee. The IRS ruled that 
the amounts paid arose out of the taxpayer’s business activities 
and were deductible under I.R.C. § 162(a).  Ltr. Rul. 201045005, 
July 29, 2010.
 REPAIRS. The IRS has published an Audit Techniques Guide 
that addresses whether an expenditure qualifies as a currently 
deductible repair or is required to be capitalized. Capitalization 
v Repairs Audit Technique Guide, IRPO ¶ 202,495, Nov. 22, 
2010.
 S CORPORATIONS
 PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was 
an S corporation which had a subsidiary which owned and 
operated a series of commercial rental properties for small 
start-up technology companies. The taxpayer, through the 
subsidiary, provided services for the buildings and tenants, 
including (1) the maintenance of all mechanical, electrical, 
BMS and control monitoring, emergency power, fire alarm, 
elevators, plumbing, and other major and minor systems in the 
properties; (2) the performance of exterior and interior cleaning, 
painting, decorating, plumbing, carpentry, landscaping, roofing, 
maintenance of heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems, 
and such other normal maintenance, repair work and minor 
construction as may be necessary; (3) investigating all necessary 
preventative maintenance programs; (4) purchasing supplies, 
materials and services; and (5) regularly inspecting and testing 
the physical condition of the properties. The IRS ruled that the 
taxpayer provided sufficient services or incurred substantial costs 
in the rental of the properties so that the rent received was derived 
from an active trade or business and was not passive investment 
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income.  Ltr. Rul. 201045006, July 14, 2010.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 2010
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR  0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
110 percent AFR 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
120 percent AFR 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
mid-term
AFR  1.53 1.52 1.52 1.52
110 percent AFR  1.68 1.67 1.67 1.67
120 percent AFR 1.83 1.82 1.82 1.81
Long-term
AFR 3.53 3.50 3.48 3.47
110 percent AFR  3.89 3.85 3.83 3.82
120 percent AFR  4.24 4.20 4.18 4.16
Rev. Rul. 2010-29, I.R.B. 2010-50.
 TAX RETURN PREPARERS. The IRS has published 
information on the new PTIN.  “New regulations require all paid 
tax return preparers to apply for a Preparer Tax Identification 
Number — even those who already have one — before preparing 
any federal tax returns in 2011. 
 “The PTIN requirement is one of the first provisions being 
implemented in a new oversight program to help regulate the 
tax preparation industry. Beginning January 1, 2011, anyone 
paid to prepare all or substantially all of any federal tax return 
or claim for refund must have a PTIN. The requirement applies 
to all paid tax return preparers, including those who are enrolled 
agents, certified public accountants and attorneys. 
 “Tax return preparers can register immediately using a new 
PTIN sign-up system available through www.IRS.gov/taxpros. 
Tax return preparers who received their PTINs prior to Sept. 
28, 2010, must register using the new sign-up system. Preparers 
will need to create an account, complete the PTIN application 
and pay a $64.25 fee. To apply for a PTIN online, follow these 
four easy steps: 
  “1. Create Your Account — Create an account by providing 
your name, email address and security question information. 
The system will then email your temporary password, which 
you will change when you go back to enter your information 
in the PTIN application. 
  “2.  Apply for Your PTIN — Complete the online application 
by providing certain information from your previous year’s tax 
return, professional credentials, and more.
  “3.  Pay Your Fee — The application will transfer you to our 
partner bank where you will make your payment by credit card 
or direct debit.
  “4.  Get Your PTIN — After the bank confirms your payment, 
your PTIN is provided online. If you already have a PTIN, you 
will retain the same number in most cases. You will also receive 
a welcome letter providing additional guidance.
 “It only takes about 15 minutes to sign up online and receive 
your PTIN. If you opt to use the paper application, Form W-
12, IRS Paid Preparer Tax Identification Number Application, 
it will take 4-6 weeks to process. For more information, visit 
IRS.gov.”  Special Edition Tax Tip 2010-13. 
PROPERTY
 DRAINAGE. The plaintiffs owned farm land neighboring the 
defendant’s property. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs’ 
land had not historically flooded until after the defendant made 
changes to the defendant’s land. The evidence showed that the 
defendant had filled wetlands on the defendant’s property and 
dug a drainage ditch which directed water onto the plaintiffs’ 
property. The filled wetland was used to grow crops where no 
crops were grown before. The plaintiffs also demonstrated that, 
before the conversion, the natural flow of draining water was 
from the plaintiffs’ land on to the defendant’s property but that 
this flow was reversed by the actions of the defendant. The trial 
court also noted that the defendant did most of the conversion 
at night, the conversion may violate state and federal wetland 
rules, and a neighbor testified that the defendant had diverted 
other drainage water after the neighbor refused to testify in 
the defendant’s favor. The trial court ruled that the defendant 
unreasonably interfered with the natural flow of surface water 
in that the benefit to the defendant was outweighed by the harm 
to the plaintiffs’ property. In a decision designated as not for 
publication, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial 
court’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence. Vokal 
v. Vokal, 2010 minn. App. Unpub. 1133 (minn. Ct. App. 
2010).
STATE TAXATION OF 
AGRICULTURE
 AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiffs owned farm land 
which was used for farming in 2004 and 2005. In early 2006 
the land was sprayed with herbicide in preparation for planting 
crops but no crop was planted because,  by the planting date, a 
sale of the property to a developer was expected to close before 
a crop could be harvested. The property had been assessed at 
$11,000 under special use valuation for 2004 and 2005 but the 
county assessed the property at $3 million as urban land for 2006 
because of the sale. The plaintiffs argued that the land was still 
eligible for agricultural valuation in 2006 because, as of January 
1, 2006, the land was still intended to be farmed and the land 
had been farmed the previous two years. The court held that 
the county was authorized to value the land in 2006 as urban 
land because the land was not used as a farm in 2006 since no 
crop was planted or harvested. Oakridge Development Co. v. 
The Property Tax Appeal Bd., 2010 Ill. App. LEXIS 1005 
(Ill. Ct. App. 2010).
 The plaintiff purchased 10.55 acres of land zoned as 
ZONING
 PRIOR NONCONFORmING USE. The defendant inherited 
land from an aunt. The aunt had used a portion of the land since 
1936 to pasture livestock until the aunt’s death. Two other parcels 
were purchased in 1950 and 1957. In 1955 the city zoned the 
land purchased in 1957 as residential but allowed the aunt to 
keep livestock on the property. The other two parcels were zoned 
agricultural but were re-zoned as residential in 1983, with the 
city again allowing the aunt to pasture animals on the entire 
property.  After the aunt died, the city informed the defendant 
that livestock was not permitted on land zoned residential and 
ordered the removal of the defendant’s three horses and a mule. 
The defendant asserted the defense of prior non-conforming 
use but the trial court found the defendant guilty of violating 
the zoning law. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding 
that the original zoning citation was too broad. The court found 
that the original 1936 parcel and the parcel purchased in 1950 
both had prior non-conforming uses in that the zoning laws, or 
lack thereof, did not prohibit the livestock until the subsequent 
zoning change in 1955. The remaining parcel obtained in 1957 
did not have a prior nonconforming use but was very small in 
comparison to the whole property and was comprised of mostly 
wooded land not used to pasture livestock. Thus, a citation for 
the whole property was too broad and the small portion of the 
land which was in violation was too small to justify the citation. 
City of Clear Lake v, kramer, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 865 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2010).
Agricultural Tax Seminars
May 10-11, 2011
I-80 Quality Inn, Grand Island, NE
 Set your calendars to join us for expert and practical 
seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax 
law. 
The seminars will be held on Tuesday and Wednesday 
from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. Registrants may attend 
one or both days, with separate pricing for each 
combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about 
farm and ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl 
will cover farm and ranch estate and business planning. 
Your registration fee includes written comprehensive 
annotated seminar materials for the days attended 
and lunch.
   More information will be posted in early 2011.
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residential and agricultural and built a residence on the land.  The 
land was assessed for property taxes as residential property but 
the plaintiff appealed to the Iowa Property Assessment Appeal 
Board (PAAB), arguing that the property should be assessed as 
agricultural land. The appeal noted that for three years prior to the 
assessment, six acres were devoted to growing alfalfa, two acres 
were used for pasturing horses and two acres were timberland. 
The plaintiff also presented a Schedule F of the federal income 
tax return showing a loss from farming operations, with $119 
in agricultural program payments and $15,221 in expenses. 
The assessor presented an analysis of the comparable income 
producing ability of the residence, at $12,000 per year in rent, 
and the farm, which produced a loss. The assessor argued that, 
because the residence had a greater income producing ability, the 
property was properly assessed as residential. The PAAB ruled 
that the land was to be assessed as agricultural property, finding 
that the plaintiff was making a good faith attempt to profitably 
breed and raise horses. The PAAB noted that the losses were 
consistent with a new business, especially with horses. The trial 
and appellate courts affirmed the PAAB ruling as supported by 
substantial evidence. Polk County Board of Review v. Property 
Assessment Appeal Bd., 2010 Iowa App. 855 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2010).
 The plaintiffs purchased a four acre rural property on which 
existed a hay barn, sheep barn, alfalfa crop land and a residence. 
The plaintiffs were employed full time and the wife intended to 
start a sheep breeding business on the property. The plaintiffs 
constructed a sheep pen but had no sheep on the property. After 
requests for information on the income from agricultural activities 
from the plaintiff went unanswered, the assessor assessed the 
property as residential. The plaintiff appealed the assessment to 
the Iowa Property Assessment Appeal Board (PAAB), arguing 
that the property should be assessed as agricultural land. The 
plaintiffs presented a federal income tax Schedule F showing 
a tax loss from the farming operations.  The PAAB ruled that 
the land should be assessed as agricultural land because the 
plaintiffs were making a good faith effort to raise alfalfa and 
sheep. The trial and appellate courts affirmed the PAAB ruling 
as supported by substantial evidence.  Polk County Board of 
Review v. Property Assessment Appeal Bd., 2010 Iowa App. 
834 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).
 TImBER. The plaintiffs were North Carolina partnerships 
which owned forest land in West Virginia. The plaintiffs’ 
operations were limited to managing the timber land, sustaining 
timber on the land and selling harvesting rights to third parties. 
The plaintiffs did no harvesting of the trees themselves. The 
plaintiffs were assessed  West Virginia business excise taxes 
which the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the management of 
timber land was exempt from the excise taxes as an agricultural 
operation. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that the 
statute, W. Va. Code § 110-23-3.10, specifically included the 
management of timber land, if no harvesting activity is included, 
in the definition of agriculture. morris v. Heartwood Forestland 
Fund Limited Partnership, 2010 W. Va. LEXIS 137 (W. Va. 
2010).
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Special Fall 2010 Sale
For November and December 2010, purchase the Principles of Agricultural Law for 
only $100 postpaid (regularly $115) and receive your first update (January 2011) free.
PRINCIPLES OF AGRICULTURAL LAW
by Roger A. mcEowen & Neil E. Harl
 The Agricultural Law Press presents a special sale on college-level textbook covering the major areas of agricultural law, 
including:
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 Semi-annual updates: A unique feature of this textbook is that it is published in looseleaf form with semi-annual updates which 
can be incorporated directly into the book, making the book as timely as it is comprehensive. All adopting instructors will receive 
complimentary updates for their texts. Students and other owners may obtain the updates by subscription. Finally, a textbook 
which never goes out of date.
The Authors:
 Roger A. McEowen, is Leonard Dolezal Professor in Agricultural  Law, Iowa State University, and Director of the ISU Center 
for Agricultural Law and Taxation. He is a member of the Kansas and Nebraska Bars, and Honorary Member of the Iowa Bar. 
Professor McEowen has also been a visiting professor of law at the University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas, 
where he taught in both the J.D. and agricultural law L.L.M. programs. Professor McEowen has published many scholarly articles 
on agricultural law.  He is also the lead author for The Law of the Land, a 300 page book on agricultural law.  Professor McEowen 
received a B.S. with distinction from Purdue University in Economics in 1986, an M.S. in Agricultural Economics from Iowa 
State University in 1990, and a J.D. from The Drake University School of Law in 1991.
 Neil E. Harl is one of the country’s foremost authorities on agricultural law. Dr. Harl is a member of the Iowa Bar, Charles F. 
Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Emeritus Professor of Economics at Iowa State University, and author of the 
14 volume treatise, Agricultural Law, the one volume Agricultural Law Manual, the two-volume Farm Income Tax Manual, and 
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Purchase Offer
 To purchase your copy at this special price, send $100 by check to Agricultural Law Press, 127 Young Rd., Kelso, WA 98626. 
The Principles may also be ordered online, www.agrilawpress.com, using your credit card through the PayPal secure online system. 
The book includes the August 2010 update and you will receive the January 2011 update free of charge. Subsequent semi-annual 
updates are available for $50 per year.
Instructors
 The Principles of Agricultural Law is also available for undergraduate, graduate and law school classes. Instructors should 
contact robert@agrilawpress.com or call 360-200-5666 for more details.
